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Abstract 
The significant worldwide decline in crude oil price beginning in mid-2014 through to 2015, which resulted 
in substantial fuel expense reductions for airlines, but no apparent commensurate reductions in industry 
average airfares has caused much public debate. This paper examines the market mechanisms through which 
crude oil price may influence airfare, which facilitates identifying the possible market and airline-specific 
characteristics that influence the extent to which crude oil price changes affect airfare. Interestingly, and new, 
our analysis reveals that the crude oil-airfare pass-through relationship can be either positive or negative, 
depending on various market and airline-specific characteristics. We find evidence that airline-specific jet 
fuel hedging strategy and market origin-destination distance contribute significantly to pass-through rates 
being negative. Specifically, the value of pass-through rate decreases with airline fuel hedging ratios and with 
market origin-destination distance, but increases with competition in origin-destination markets. Even when 
the pass-through relationship is positive, suggesting that a portion of airlines’ fuel cost savings is passed on 
to consumers via lower airfares, this research reveals the market and airline-specific factors that limit the size 
of these savings passed on to consumers via lower airfares.     
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1. Introduction 
Crude oil price declined from $111.8/barrel in June 2014 to $38.01/barrel in 
December 2015, an approximate 66% reduction.1 Unsurprisingly, financial reports of the 
four major U.S. airlines – American, Delta, United, and Southwest – show that they all 
experienced more than 30% reduction in fuel expenses from 2014 to 2015.2 In spite of 
airline fuel cost savings, industry analysts argued that airfares have been “essentially stable 
during this period.” 3 Airline price index data released by the Bureau of Labor and Statistics 
showed that the monthly average airfare decreased by less than 5% during this period. This 
evidence suggests that airline fuel cost savings have little or no pass-through to airfare, 
which is disturbing for many consumers of air travel. However, one may argue that an 
industry average airfare may not be sufficiently informative of how air carriers adjust 
airfare in response to their fuel cost changes. It is possible that airfare tracks crude oil and 
jet fuel prices better in some air travel markets than others. 
As such, this paper seeks to answer two key questions: (i) what are the market 
mechanisms through which crude oil price influences airfare? and (ii) what are the possible 
factors that may influence the extent to which crude oil price changes affect airfare? To 
achieve this goal, we first specify a theoretical model of air travel demand and supply in 
an origin-destination market. We rely on this theoretical model to study market channels 
through which changes in crude oil price may be reflected in airfare. The theoretical model 
yields clear predictions of the relationship between crude oil price and airfare, as well as 
reveals factors that may influence the strength of the relationship. With the theoretical 
model as a guiding framework, we subsequently compile a data set of information drawn 
from U.S. domestic air travel markets, then use reduced-form regression analysis to 
empirically test predictions from the theoretical model.  
Empirical studies that focus on the cost-price pass-through relationship have been 
done on various industries. In the energy sector, Alexeeva-Talebi (2011) examined the 
                                                          
1
 Oil price is represented by Brent crude oil spot price from U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).  
2
 For example, American and Delta reported more than 40% jet fuel expense saving, while United and 
Southwest had over 30% reduction in fuel costs, according to these airlines’ 10K reports.  
3
 The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/business/energy-environment/airlines-reap-
record-profits-and-passengers-get-peanuts.html?_r=0. Similar arguments made by other interested business 
analysts exist in other media sources, such as CNN-Business, Washington Post, and Forbes. Relevant articles 
are easily searchable in these websites; thus, we decide not to list them all in the paper.   
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impact of introducing the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme on unleaded 
petrol retail prices in fourteen EU member states. Fabra and Reguant (2014) estimated the 
channels affecting pass-through of emissions costs to electricity prices and found a 
complete pass-through of costs to prices. In the retail food industry, Berck et. al. (2009) 
studied the pass-through from price shocks of raw commodities (corn, wheat, and gasoline) 
to supermarket retail prices of ready-to-eat cereals and fresh chicken. Kim and Cotterill 
(2008) estimated the pass-through rate of increases in raw milk prices to cheese prices. 
Bonnet and Villas-Boas (2016) focused on the French coffee market and studied the 
asymmetric pass-through patterns of retail coffee prices in response to upstream cost 
shocks. In the automobile industry, Gron and Swenson (2000) investigated how exchange 
rate changes influence the manufacturers’ input market decisions and the importance of 
accounting for this impact on the estimated pass-through rate driven by the exchange rate 
changes. Hellerstein and Villas-Boas (2010) studied the relationship between a firm’s 
degree of vertical integration along the supply chain and its pass-through of exchange-rate-
induced cost shocks to retail prices in the U.S. auto industry. The above-listed studies have 
all paid particular attention to the supply-side pass-on effects to product price levels from 
cost shocks.  
While the cost-price pass-through relationship is well examined in many sectors of 
our economy, there has been a scarcity of relevant studies in commercial aviation. A subset 
of these studies contains purely theoretical analyses that examine the impact of cost-side 
shocks to airfare, product quality, and airline performance measures. Forsyth (2008), for 
instance, studied the impact of climate change policies, such as carbon taxes or emission 
permits, 4 on airline market competition, airfare, and profitability. The author found that 
the impact differs depending on whether the market structure is competitive, monopolistic 
or oligopolistic. Using a theoretical model, Brueckner and Zhang (2010) argue that an 
increase in jet fuel price leads to higher airfare, lower flight frequency, and a higher load 
factor.  
Empirical studies, such as Malina et. al. (2012), find U.S. airlines may not pass 
through to airfare the full cost of emission charge since the imperfectly competitive market 
                                                          
4
 Considered as an increase in “effective fuel price”. A carbon-tax scheme or carbon emission permits charge 
is effectively viewed as equivalent to an increase in jet fuel prices paid by airlines. Many studies adopt this 
idea, see Brueckner and Zhang (2010), Toru (2011), Malena et. al. (2012), Brueckner and Abreu (2016).  
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structure facilitates airlines with market power to absorb part of the cost increase. 
Koopmans and Lieshout (2016) compute the concentration level for each aviation market 
and suggest that most aviation markets in the world can be characterized as an oligopoly 
with differentiated products.5 Based on the pass-through rates in differentiated products 
oligopolies computed by Zimmerman and Carlson (2010), Koopmans and Lieshout (2016) 
further suggested that an airline-specific cost shock is likely to have a less than 50 percent 
pass-through to airfare, but an industry-wide cost shock will have a larger pass-through to 
airfare depending on the degree of competition between airlines. Duplantis (2011) uses 
reduced-form regression analysis and find an industry-wide fuel pass-through rate of 0.08 
during periods of constant capacity, and 0.89 during periods of changing capacity. Toru 
(2011) adopt a structural econometric model and find the average estimated pass-through 
rates in the European airline market fall into the range of 0.985 to 0.989 when the 
corresponding effective jet fuel prices increase by 50% to 500%. 
Our paper is different from the above studies in the following ways. First, unlike 
previous studies, we consider both demand-side and supply-side market channels through 
which changes in crude oil price pass-through to airfare. For example, on the air travel 
demand side, changes in crude oil price, through the pressure placed on gasoline price, 
trigger changes in consumer substitution between air travel and private automobile travel 
in shorter distance markets. It is indeed important to note that the demand-driven price 
transmission channel considered in our analysis has not been considered in the 
aforementioned literature. 6  Neglecting the demand-side pass-on effects can result in 
substantial bias in measuring the crude oil price-airfare pass-through relationship.  
On the air travel supply side, changes in crude oil price spur changes in jet fuel 
price, which in turn causes airline fuel costs to change. Focusing on this supply-side pass-
on effect is likely to result in an inaccurate perception that there ought to be a direct 
                                                          
5
 Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) compute the pass-through rates in a perfect competitive environment and in 
monopolistic market. They find that an industry-wide cost change will be completely passed along to 
consumers in a perfect competitive market. A monopolist with a constant marginal cost will pass through 50 
percent of a marginal cost change to market price when facing a linear demand. Zimmerman and Carlson 
(2010) find disparate pass-through across the Cournot and Bertrand models. In differentiated oligopoly 
markets with Cournot type, firm-specific pass-through rates are between 20 percent and 50 percent and 
sector-wide pass-through rates are greater than the above range. In Bertrand type market structure, firm-
specific pass-through rates are less than 50 percent while greater than 50 percent for sector-wide cost shocks. 
6
 We find one exception by Hayashi and Trapani (1987) who explicitly model the role of energy costs in 
affecting both demand and supply side of U.S. air travel market.  
 5 
 
positively correlated pass-on effect from jet fuel price to airfares, a prediction made by 
many business analysts. Our research therefore emphasizes the importance of jointly 
considering both demand side and supply side market channels when examining the crude 
oil price-airfare pass-through relationship.  
Second, unlike previous studies, our theoretical and empirical models allow 
market-specific and airline-specific factors to affect airfare levels as well as the rate of 
crude oil price-airfare pass-through. The previous literature has uniquely focused on how 
cost shocks impact firms’ pricing strategies, profitability, and other firm-level and market-
level performance measures.7 There is a notable lack of discussion on the driving forces 
and impacting factors that directly or indirectly influence the magnitude of the cost-price 
pass-through in the aviation sector.8  
This research makes clear that a key airline-specific factor that influences the sign 
and strength of the crude oil price-airfare pass-through relationship is the extent to which 
an airline engages in jet fuel hedging.9 Extent of fuel hedging here means the proportion 
of an airline’s estimated fuel consumption (in volume) covered by fuel hedging contracts. 
10
 Our analysis also reveals that an airline’s hedging strategy influences the marginal 
impact of other market-specific factors on the pass-through rate. To best of our knowledge, 
our paper is the first to provide a formal theoretical and empirical analysis on how airlines’ 
fuel hedging strategies influence the size of crude oil price-airfare pass-through.  
Our paper also contributes to the literature on financial risk management in aviation. 
Several studies have examined the impact of airline jet fuel hedging programs on the firms’ 
market value, fuel price risk exposure, and operating cost. For example, Carter, Rogers, 
                                                          
7
 See Forsyth (2008), Brueckner and Zhang (2010), and Toru (2011), etc.  
8
 There is a broad range of literature on other industries that studies the underlying driving forces and 
influencing factors that may lead to different estimates of cost-price pass-through. Hellerstein and Villas-
Boas (2010) is one example that focuses on the auto manufacturing sector. They look at the influence of 
vertical structure of auto production on the pass-through rate estimates driven by changing exchange rates. 
Another example, Verboven and Dijk (2009) propose a theoretical framework and introduce a “discount” 
variable to capture the pass-on effect due to a shock in a cartel input market, and the size of discount is 
determined by intensity of market competition in the downstream industry. 
9
 Airlines utilize over-the-counter fuel derivative instruments to hedge a portion of its expected future jet 
fuel requirements to address not only fuel price increases, but also fuel price volatility. 
10
 Financial instruments often used individually or collectively in airline fuel hedging programs include, but 
are not limited to the following: forward contracts, futures contracts, options, swaps, and collars [Morrell and 
Swan (2006)]. The percentage of estimated fuel consumption covered by fuel hedging programs is reported 
in airlines’ annual reports.  
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and Simkins (2006) investigated whether jet fuel hedging behavior of airlines is a source 
of their market value, and find that an airline’s jet fuel hedging is indeed positively related 
to its market value. Treanor et.al. (2014) examined the effects of both financial and 
operational hedging on jet fuel exposure in the U.S. airline industry and find both types of 
hedging are important tools in reducing airline exposure to jet fuel price risk. Lim and 
Hong (2014) studied the role of fuel hedging in reducing airlines’ operating costs, and 
therefore its role in generating cost efficiency gains for airlines. We, instead, examine both 
theoretically and empirically, the role of jet fuel hedging programs as an influencing factor 
of airline pricing and of the crude oil price-airfare pass-through relationship.  
Key results from the analysis are as follows. First, our theoretical model predicts 
that the crude oil price-airfare pass-through relationship, also referred to as “price 
transmission” relationship, 11  can be either positive or negative; and this pass-through 
varies by some firm-specific and market-specific characteristics. To the best of our 
knowledge, a formal theoretical prediction with systematic supporting empirical evidence 
of a negative crude oil price-airfare pass-through relationship is new to the literature. Note 
that firm-specific and market-specific situations that yield a negative crude oil price-airfare 
pass-through relationship further imply that falling crude oil price results in a higher, rather 
than lower, airfare. Such countercyclical movement of crude oil price with many airfares 
has been perplexing to market analysts, and frustrating for many consumers of air travel.   
A key firm-specific characteristic is airlines’ jet fuel hedging ratios, i.e. the 
percentage of airlines’ jet fuel consumption (in volume) covered by their hedging contracts. 
The theory predicts that the crude oil price-airfare pass-through rate declines with higher 
airlines’ fuel hedging ratios. Specifically, on the one hand, a greater percentage of fuel 
hedging has a weakening effect on a positive pass-through, reducing the direct pass-on 
effect from crude oil price changes to airfare. On the other hand, a greater percentage of 
fuel hedging magnifies a negative pass-through, causing a greater increase (decrease) in 
airfare as crude oil price decreases (increases).12 Consistent with what the theory predicts, 
                                                          
11
 This term “price transmission” has been used interchangeably with “cost pass-through” in many empirical 
works that study the cost-price pass-through relationship in a variety of markets, such as Aguiar and Santana 
(2002), Leibtag et. al. (2007), Bonnet and Villas-Boas (2016) and many others.  
12
 Graphically, our theory suggests that a curve depicting the relationship between crude oil-airfare pass-
through rate and an airline’s fuel hedging ratio is negatively sloped. 
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our empirical results suggest a negative relationship between crude oil price-airfare pass-
through rates and airlines’ fuel hedging ratios.  
One market-specific characteristic that influences the pass-through rate is the 
intensity of market competition. Our theory model predicts that this effect can be positive 
or negative, depending on airlines’ jet fuel hedging ratios. Our empirical results suggest an 
average positive effect of market competition on the crude oil price–airfare pass-through 
rate when competition intensity is measured by the number of non-stop products offered in 
the market. The competition effect on pass-through rate from number of non-stop products 
is particularly stronger than the effects when market competition is measured by number 
of competing one-intermediate stop products, and number of competing products with two 
or more intermediate stops.  
Another market-specific characteristic that has substantial influence on the crude 
oil-airfare pass-through rate is the direct distance between the origin and destination. Our 
theory predicts the influence of market distance on the pass-through rate depends on both 
the range of distance and airlines’ adoption of jet fuel hedging programs. The empirical 
results suggest that the value of crude oil price-airfare pass-through elasticity is negatively 
influenced by market distance.  
 Given our finding that the pass-through relationship is positive in some market and 
airline specific cases, but negative in other cases, this research reveals why it can be 
misleading to focus on the relationship between industry average airfare and crude oil price 
changes. An industry average airfare masks the countervailing negative and positive 
responses of various market and airline specific airfares to changes in crude oil price. 
Furthermore, even when the pass-through relationship is positive, suggesting that a portion 
of airlines’ fuel cost savings is passed on to consumers via lower airfares, this research 
reveals the market and airline specific factors that limit the size of these savings passed on 
to consumers via lower airfares.       
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we specify and analyze a 
theoretical model of air travel demand and supply in an origin-destination market. Section 
3 provides the empirical analysis, which starts by describing the data, then specifying and 
estimating the empirical model, and discussing the empirical results. Concluding remarks 
are gathered in section 4.    
 8 
 
2. Theoretical Model 
The purpose of this section is to provide a theoretical framework to describe market 
mechanisms through which changes in crude oil price pass through to airfare, as well as to 
reveal and better understand some underlying factors that may play a role in influencing 
the pass-through rate. The theoretical model comprises both demand and supply sides of 
the market for air travel.13  
To construct the consumer demand function, we consider consumers’ willingness 
to substitute between the mode of mass transit by air travel and alternate modes of 
transportation. In particular, the alternate mode of transport that our analysis focuses on is 
private automobile travel. Conditional on the two modes of transport being technically 
feasible between the origin and destination, we posit that consumers’ willingness to 
substitute between the two modes of transport depends on the market distance between 
origin and destination.14 In line with the argument made by Hayashi and Trapani (1987), 
the substitutability between flying and driving is influenced by the relevant ground 
transport cost, determined by gasoline price and time spent driving. 15  Following this 
argument, air travel as well as other modes of mass transit, become relatively cheaper 
compared with private automobile travel when there is an increase in gasoline price. 
Therefore, we introduce gasoline price into the air travel demand equation.  
On the supply side, airline fuel cost is a major component of airline operating costs. 
During year 2014 the aviation fuel expense of the aforementioned four major U.S. airlines 
accounts for approximately 32% of their respective total operating expenses, the largest 
component of airline operating costs, followed by their operating expenses on labor.16 
Airlines’ aviation fuel costs are directly affected by the jet fuel price level. Both gasoline 
                                                          
13
 We focus the crude oil-airfare pass-through analysis in the short-run, and therefore, both consumer and 
firm behavior reflect their responses to changing energy prices during a time horizon sufficiently short such 
that there are little or no changes in production technology in response to energy price changes.  
14
 According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, among all the long-distance (greater than 50 miles) 
travel modes in the U.S., 89.5% of annual trips are taken by personal automobiles, 7.4% are taken by air 
travels, 2.1% are taken by buses, only 0.8% are taken by train. See the following source link: 
https://www.bts.gov/archive/publications/america_on_the_go/long_distance_transportation_patterns/entire 
15
 Hayashi and Trapani (1987) consider the total ground transport cost of a trip is the sum of gasoline 
consumption valued at current cost per gallon, and time cost valued at average hourly earnings of non-
supervisory personnel for all industries in the US. However, to simply the analysis in our model, we do not 
explicitly model the time spent on driving.  
16
 Labor cost represents 21% to 40% of total operating expenses for the four major airlines during the sample 
period. Readers may refer to airlines’ annual reports for detailed information of their operating expenses.  
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and jet fuel are petroleum products that are refined from crude oil, therefore, changes in 
crude oil price result in changes in jet fuel and gasoline prices.   
In summary, our discussion above posits that changes in crude oil price affect both 
the demand and supply sides of air travel markets. In particular, we posit that crude oil 
price changes affect the demand for air travel via influencing the relative cost of automobile 
travel through causal changes in gasoline price, while the supply side of air travel is 
affected due to causal changes in jet fuel price.17 
2.1 Demand  
We consider an air travel market as directional travel between a specific origin and 
destination, while an air travel product is the specific routing used when transporting 
passengers from the origin to the destination. As such, a given origin-destination market 
may have several competing products that are differentiated by their routing. Following the 
framework of Shubik-Levitan (1980) demand system, the demand of an air travel product 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 among 𝑛 differentiated air travel products in a market can be represented by: 𝑞𝑖 = 𝐻𝑖 − 𝛽𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑛−1𝑗≠𝑖  for all 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛   (1) 
where 𝑞𝑖 represents the demand level for air travel product 𝑖, and 𝑃𝑖 is the associated price 
level for product 𝑖. All other products are considered substitute goods to product 𝑖, placing 
an equal cross-price impact on product 𝑖 ’s demand, which is measured by the 
parameter 𝛽 > 0. We make a standard assumption when specifying a system of demand 
equations, which is that the demand impact of an own price change is greater than cross-
price demand impacts, i.e. 𝛽 > 𝛽. 
Motivated by analyses in Gillen et. al. (2003), to account for the different elasticity 
of air travel demand in markets of differing distances, we argue that travelers are likely to 
be more (less) sensitive to airfare changes in shorter (longer) distance markets. That is, air 
travel demand tends to be more elastic in shorter-haul markets than it is in longer-haul 
markets, simply because driving is often considered a more realistic alternative for relative 
shorter distance travel. We capture this effect by specifying 𝛽 to be a decreasing function 
of market distance based on an exponential functional form, i.e.:  
                                                          
17
 U.S. Energy Information Administration website provides daily spot prices for crude oil and its refinery 
products, which include gasoline and jet fuel. It clearly shows strong positive relationships among these 
prices. Readers may refer to the source link: https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm  
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𝛽 = 𝑒−𝛽0𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡      (2) 
where 𝛽0 > 0, and 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a metric of market distance, measured by the non-stop 
flying distance between the origin and the destination of the market. Rearranging equation 
(1) to express it  in inverse demand function form,18 and considering the relationship 
between 𝛽 and market distance specified in equation (2), it is evident that 𝛽 gets smaller 
as market distance increases, and smaller 𝛽 corresponds to a steeper inverse demand curve, 
suggesting a less elastic air travel demand in longer distance markets.  
 We now augment the specification of the demand function for air travel product 𝑖 
to capture the fact that a product’s level of demand depends on several product-specific 
and market-specific factors. In particular, let the 𝐻𝑖 component of product 𝑖′𝑠 demand be 
determined by the following functional specification:  𝐻𝑖 = ℎ0 + ℎ1𝑋1 + ℎ2𝑋2𝑖 + ℎ3∑ 𝑋2𝑗𝑛−1𝑗≠𝑖 + 𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑃𝑔    (3) 
where 𝑋1 is a vector of demand-shifting factors that are not product-specific and influence 
the level of demand for all air travel products, while ℎ1 is a vector of parameters that 
caputre the marginal demand impact of each of the variables in 𝑋1,  respectively. 𝑋2𝑖 
and 𝑋2𝑗 are vectors of product-specific non-price characteristics that influence the level of 
demand for product 𝑖, while ℎ2 is a vector of parameters that capture the marginal demand 
impact of each of the product-specific variables in 𝑋2𝑖. The demand-shifting factors in 𝑋2𝑗 
marginally impact product 𝑖’s demand according to parameter vector ℎ3. Including 𝑋2𝑖 and  𝑋2𝑗 in equation (3) recognizes that the demand for product 𝑖 is not only influenced by its 
own non-price characteristics, but also influenced by the non-price characteristics of 
substitute products, a demand feature we often see in discrete choice models of demand 
[Gayle and Xie (2018 and 2019)].      
Equation (3) recognizes that air travel product 𝑖′𝑠 demand level is influenced by 
gasoline price, 𝑃𝑔, but its marginal impact on air travel demand depends on 𝛾 and 𝐷𝑖. 𝛾 is 
a function of market distance, 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡, and 𝐷𝑖 identifies the intermediate stop(s) feature 
of product 𝑖, i.e., 𝐷𝑖 identifies whether product 𝑖 is non-stop, has one intermediate stop, or 
                                                          
18
 𝑃𝑖 = 𝐻𝑖𝛽 − 1𝛽 𝑞𝑖 + ?̃?𝛽 (∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑛−1𝑗≠𝑖 ), for all 𝑖 = 1,2, … 𝑛 
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has two or more intermediate stops. First, we discuss why market distance does matter for 
the marginal impact of gasoline price on air travel demand.  
A consumer’s travel cost on a trip can be broken down into implicit and explicit 
costs. The explicit travel costs are the actual cash payments the consumer makes to obtain 
transportation services for the trip, e.g. purchase of airline ticket for air travel services, or 
purchase of gasoline in the case of automobile travel. The implicit cost of travel a consumer 
bears is the opportunity cost of the consumer’s time used up in getting from the origin to 
destination. As such, the implicit travel cost suggests a consumer’s travel cost is positively 
correlated with the time it takes to complete the journey from origin to destination. 
It is expected that consumers’ choice between private automobile travel and air 
travel depends on the relative cost that the consumer faces between the two modes of 
transportation, which is driven by the implicit component of a consumer’s travel cost 
previously discussed, i.e., the relative cost is influenced by the relative travel times 
associated with the two modes of transportation. As previously mentioned, we use non-
stop flying miles between the market’s endpoints as an index of the market distance. Even 
though this metric of market distance is not an approximation of the actual driving distance, 
the assumption is that it is positively correlated with driving distance, i.e., the further away 
the destination is from the origin as measured by non-stop flying miles, the greater will be 
the driving distance between these endpoints. 
First, when consumers travel from an origin to a destination, total traveling time 
increases as the two endpoints become farther away, regardless of the chosen mode of 
transportation. In other words, the associated total time cost of each transportation mode to 
consumers is expected to be a monotonic increasing function of the market distance. 
However, one difference between driving with personal vehicles and flying with airplanes 
is a lumpsum/fixed component of travel time associated with air travel, which includes 
time required in getting to the airport, going through security checkpoint(s), and waiting to 
board the aircraft; whereas auto travelers can simply “jump” into the car and begin the 
journey towards their destination. For the air transport mode in a given market, if a 
consumer is traveling with indirect flights, there will be some layover time for each 
connecting flight, adding extra time cost to the total time cost compared to those who fly 
with a direct flight.  
 12 
 
Second, we assume that the cost to the consumer of driving, which includes the 
opportunity cost of time, increases faster with market distance compared to the cost to the 
consumer of air travel. In particular, due to the substantially faster pace in which air 
transport technology covers a mile towards the destination compared to automobile 
transport technology, the incremental time cost to the consumer associated with using 
ground transport to cover an extra mile toward the destination is expected to be greater than 
the incremental time cost associated with using air transport to cover the extra mile. 
Figure 1: Diagram illustrating consumer travel cost curves for the two distinct modes of transportation  
 
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between travel cost (the aggregate of explicit and 
implicit components of travel costs) a consumer faces with each transporation mode and 
market distance at given gaosline and airline ticket price levels. The travel cost curves 
depicted in the figure have distinctive features, which are consistent with discussions above. 
Key distincitve features of the travel cost curves are: (i) upward sloping, which is owing to 
consumers’ implicit cost component of travel cost increasing with travel time as the two 
endpoints become farther away from each other; 19  (ii) the automobile travel cost curve is 
                                                          
19
 We use upward sloping straight lines for illustrative purpose. The actual total traveling time cost associated 
with each transportation mode does not necessarily follow constant rate of change with market distance. 
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the steeper among the two, reflecting the fact that the incremental time cost to the consumer 
associated with using ground transport to cover one extra mile towards the destination is 
greater than the incremental time cost associated with using air transport to cover the extra 
mile; (iii) owing to a lumpsum/fixed component of travel time cost associated with air 
travel, the air travel cost curve has a positive vertical intercept; and (iv) the vertical intercept 
for the automobile travel cost curve is located approximately close to the origin of the 
diagram, indicating nearly zero lumpsum/fixed time cost associated with private 
automobile travel.  
In Figure 1, the automobile travel cost curve intersects the air travel cost curve at 𝐸0, which identifies the market distance 𝑑0 at which consumers’ travel cost from using air 
transport is equal to their travel cost from using automobile transport. As such, in a market 
with distance 𝑑0, the two transportation options are perceived by consumers to be perfect 
substitutes. Starting at market distance 𝑑0, as market distance decreases, the perceived 
substitutability between the two modes of transportation also decreases, with automobile 
travel being the prefered mode of transport due to this mode having lower travel cost to the 
consumer at these shorter market distances. Again starting at market distance 𝑑0, but now 
moving towards longer market distances, the perceived substitutability between the two 
modes of transportation again decreases, with air travel being the prefered mode of 
transport due to this mode having lower travel cost to the consumer at these longer market 
distances. In other words, the consumers’ perceived substitutability between the two modes 
of transportation has an inverted U-shaped relationship with market distance, with the 
highest perceived substitutability occuring at market distance 𝑑0. Assuming consumers’ 
perceived substitutability is also measured on the vertical axis of Figure 1, we use a thin 
dashed arc with arrows to represent the degree of substitutability between the two modes 
of tansportation across market distances. 
Using the consumer travel cost framework depicted in Figure 1 as a starting point, 
to develop the demand model further, it’s useful to consider comparative statics resulting 
from a change in gasoline price. An increase in gasoline price will result in a leftward shift 
and rotation of the automobile cost curve reflecting the fact that the explicit cost component 
of automobile travel cost is now higher for each market distance. With this change in the 
automobile cost curve, consumers in markets with distance 𝑑0 will no longer be indifferent 
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between driving versus flying, but will prefer flying causing an increase in air travel 
demand in such markets. Furthermore, it is straightforward to use the model to argue that 
the largest impacts on air travel demand resulting from changes in gasoline price will be in 
markets with distances in the neighborhood of 𝑑0, with demand impacts attenuating at 
market distances further away from 𝑑0.  
Therefore, the marginal impacts on air travel demand resulting from changes in 
gasoline price should reflect the inverted U-shaped relationship between consumers’ 
perceived substitutability between the two modes of transportation and market distances. 
To capture such nonlinear marginal impact on air travel demand resulting from changes in 
gasoline price, we specify that 𝛾 in equation (3) depends on market distance given by:     𝛾 = 𝛾1𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡2    (4) 
where 𝛾1 > 0, 𝛾2 < 0, 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∈ (0,− 𝛾1𝛾2] and 𝛾1𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡2 > 0; and 
the maximum value of 𝛾  occurs when 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 = − 𝛾12𝛾2 , corresponding to the idea 
captured by 𝑑0 in Figure 2. 20  We now discuss why the intermediate stop(s) feature of an 
air travel product, captured by 𝐷𝑖 in equation (3), also influences the marginal impact on 
demand resulting from changes in gasoline price.  
For a given origin-destination market (thus for a given market distance), a consumer 
is more likely to prefer an air travel product with shorter total travel time (flying time plus 
layover time for connecting flights), ceteris paribus. Therefore, the demand of a non-stop 
air travel product is likely more strongly affected by changes in gasoline price than a 
product with one intermediate stop, which has greater total travel time relative to non-stop 
products. Similarly, in a given origin-destination market, the demand of an air travel 
product that has one intermediate stop is likely more heavily affected by changes in 
gasoline price than a product with two or more intermediate stops. Consequently, when 
gasoline price increases, the level of air travel product 𝑖’s demand is expected to have a 
greater increase if product 𝑖 is a non-stop flight than if it is a one-stop flight; and the 
demand increase is greater if it is a one-stop flight than if it is a two-or-more-stop flight.  
                                                          
20
 A simple quadratic function is sufficient to capture the changing substitutability between automobile travel 
and air travel as market distance varies. Other polynomial functions that capture the same idea are also 
applicable but not considered here for computational simplicity.  
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To introduce the above discussed effects into the demand equations, we formally 
characterize 𝐷𝑖 using the following equation:  𝐷𝑖 = ℎ4𝑑𝑖0 + ℎ5𝑑𝑖1 + ℎ6𝑑𝑖2      (5) 
In equation (5), 𝑑𝑖0, 𝑑𝑖1 and 𝑑𝑖2 are each zero-one indicator variables: 𝑑𝑖0 takes the value 
1 if product 𝑖  is a non-stop product; 𝑑𝑖1  takes the value 1 if product 𝑖  has only one 
intermediate stop; and 𝑑𝑖2 takes the value 1 if  product 𝑖 has two or more intermediate stops. 
Therefore, air travel product 𝑖 can only fall into one of three intermedaite stop(s) product 
categories, 𝑑𝑖0 = 1, 𝑑𝑖1 = 1 or 𝑑𝑖2 = 1. Parameters ℎ4, ℎ5 and ℎ6 capture the respective 
intermedaite stop(s) specifc marginal impact of gasoline price on product 𝑖′𝑠 demand, and 
based on our previous discussion, they have the following relationship: ℎ4 > ℎ5 > ℎ6 ≥ 0. 
 Last, we specify that gasoline price, 𝑃𝑔, is influenced by crude oil price, 𝑃𝑐, via a 
simple equation given by: 𝑃𝑔 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑃𝑐 . Through the parameter 𝛿1 > 0, the positive 
marginal effect of gasoline price on air travel demand is translated into an indirect positive 
marginal effect of crude oil price on air travel demand. 
2.2 Supply Relation: Bertrand-Nash Pricing Game 
We assume each of the n differentiated air travel products is offered by a different 
airline. As such, the system of n profit functions across competing airlines in the origin-
destination market is the following:   𝜋𝑖 = (𝑃𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)𝑞𝑖             for all 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛   (6) 
where 𝑐1, 𝑐2, … , 𝑐𝑛 are the marginal costs that firms incur to provide products 1,2, … , 𝑛, 
respectively. We assume that airlines simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose prices, 
in Bertrand-Nash fashion, to maximize profit. Assuming strictly positive prices, 𝑃𝑖 > 0, 
and production levels, 𝑞𝑖 > 0, the following closed-form expression for Nash equilibrium 
airfares can be obtained:21  𝑃𝑖 = 2𝛽−(𝑛−2)?̃?(2𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝐻𝑖 + ?̃?(2𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?] (∑ 𝐻𝑗𝑛−1𝑗≠𝑖 ) +  𝛽[2𝛽−(𝑛−2)?̃?](2𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?] 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽?̃?(2𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?] (∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑛−1𝑗≠𝑖 ) for all 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛    (7) 
We further specify airline 𝑖’s marginal cost function as: 𝑐𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑍1 + 𝛼2𝑍2𝑖 + 𝛼3𝑖𝑃𝑓 + 𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑃𝑓 + 𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑃𝑓  (8) 
                                                          
21
 The reader is referred to the appendix in Gayle and Lin (2020) for detailed calculations. 
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where 𝐷𝑖𝑐 = 𝛼4𝑑𝑖0 + 𝛼5𝑑𝑖1 + 𝛼6𝑑𝑖2       (9) 𝛼3𝑖 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖     (10) 𝑃𝑓 = 𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝑃𝑐      (11) 
In the equations above, 𝑐𝑖 represents the marginal cost incurred by the relevant airline to 
provide air travel product 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛; 𝑍1 is a vector of non-product-specific cost-shifting 
variables that affect an airline’s marginal cost; 𝑍2𝑖  is a vector of product-specific cost-
shifting variables; while 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 are vectors of parameters that capture the influence of 
the respective cost-shifting variables on the level of marginal cost for product 𝑖 . 𝑃𝑓 
represents jet fuel spot price. Equation (8) reveals that jet fuel spot price, 𝑃𝑓, influences the 
marginal cost of air travel product 𝑖  through three distinct sources: (i) through the 
interaction of 𝑃𝑓 with 𝛼3𝑖;  (ii) through the interaction of 𝑃𝑓 with 𝐷𝑖𝑐; and (iii) through the 
interaction of 𝑃𝑓 with 𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖. We now discuss each of these sources in turn.  
The parameter 𝛼3𝑖 captures a portion of the marginal effect of jet fuel spot price on 
airline 𝑖’s marginal cost of providing product 𝑖. The way in which 𝛼3𝑖 captures a partial 
impact of jet fuel spot price on airline 𝑖’s marginal cost is specified in equation (10), where 
variable 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖  measures the proportion of airline 𝑖’s estimated fuel consumption (in 
volume) covered by fuel hedging contracts. 22  Airlines utilize over-the-counter fuel 
derivative instruments that have petroleum products as underlying assets, such as crude oil, 
heating oil, and gasoline, which are highly correlated with jet fuel, to hedge a portion of its 
expected future jet fuel requirements to address not only fuel price increases, but also fuel 
price volatility, hedge costs, and hedge collateral requirements (Southwest 2013).23 The 
definition of the hedging ratio implies 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖 ∈ [0,1], and 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 0 when airline 𝑖 
                                                          
22
 Note that we model equation (10) as a linear function; however, with a willingness to handle additional 
computational challenges, the hedging ratio may enter 𝛼3𝑖  non-linearly. In addition, fuel hedging ratio, 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖, is based on the description in airlines’ annual reports. It represents the average percent of estimated 
fuel consumption requirements in terms of gallons covered by fuel derivative contracts at varying underlying 
commodities price levels (for example, see Southwest 2013, p59; Alaska 2013, p132).  
23
 For example, airlines may use a collar (combination of a call and a put option) to “lock in” price that will 
be paid for fuel between two agreed price levels (“strike price”), in order to mitigate the impact of spot market 
fuel price volatility [Morrell and Swan (2006)]. Specifically, the call option gives airlines the right to 
purchase the fuel (or other commodities) at a future date for a price agreed today; while the put option gives 
airlines the right to sell it at a future date for a price agreed today. These financial instruments do not 
necessarily require the delivery of the hedging assets. We use Southwest Airlines as an example for 
illustrative purpose, as it is a relatively experienced hedger in the industry [Lim and Turner (2016)]. 
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does not engage in any fuel hedging, leading to a complete exposure of the product 𝑖’s 
marginal cost, 𝑐𝑖, to jet fuel and crude oil market fluctuations. In the event that an airline 
does not have any hedging programs, then we would expect a positive correlation between 
the spot price of fuel and product 𝑖’s marginal cost. Therefore, the constant term in equation 
(10) is expected to be positive, i.e., 𝑎0 > 0, capturing the positive marginal effect of jet 
fuel spot price on the marginal cost for air travel products when airlines do not hedge.   
In most cases, airlines utilize a mixture of financial derivative instruments as a form 
of insurance against the potential for significant increase in fuel prices. When an airline 
hedges directly in jet fuel, the use of fuel hedging programs is beneficial during subsequent 
periods of rising spot fuel price since the airline is able to procure the hedged portion of 
fuel requirements at a cheaper “locked-in” price level; whereas, when an airline hedges in 
other jet fuel proxies, such as crude oil, heating oil or gasoil, the airline is able to receive 
financial gains upon execution of these hedging contracts [Lim and Turner (2016)]. 
Assuming other determinants of marginal cost are equal across airlines, airlines with 
relatively higher jet fuel hedging ratio benefit in terms of having relatively lower marginal 
cost during periods of rising fuel spot price. On the other hand, an airline’s fuel hedging 
program is disadvantaged during subsequent periods of falling fuel spot price since the 
airline is obligated to obtain the hedged portion of its fuel at a more expensive “locked-in” 
price in cases when the airline hedges directly in jet fuel, or incur financial loss in cases 
when the airline hedges in other commodities. Therefore, airlines with relatively greater 
fuel hedging ratios are disadvantaged in terms of having relatively higher marginal cost 
during periods of falling fuel spot price. These arguments imply a negative correlation 
between fuel spot price and the marginal cost of airlines with a sufficiently large hedging 
ratio, which in turn imply that 𝑎1 < 0.24  
Given that 𝑎0 > 0  and 𝑎1 < 0 , equation (10) reveals that the entire hedging 
parameter, 𝛼3𝑖 , can be either positive or negative, determined by airline 𝑖 ’s hedging 
                                                          
24
 We did not model the so called “locked-in” fuel/fuel proxies’ price in this equation for two reasons. First, 
airlines tend to use a portfolio of hedging contracts that vary by financial derivatives (futures, forwards, 
swaps, etc. and what are the underlying assets), durations, purchase volume, and so on. The detailed 
information of these contracts, including the contracted fuel/fuel proxies’ prices, are normally not observable 
to researchers. Second, these “locked-in” prices influence costs indirectly only when airlines execute their 
fuel hedging contracts, achieving a lump sum dollar amount of financial gain or loss at the end of the relevant 
time period. Airlines, in essence, pay the spot market fuel price for their daily operations.   
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strategy. In particular, 𝛼3𝑖 > 0 when airline 𝑖 has a fuel hedging ratio, 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖 ∈ [0,− 𝑎0𝑎1), 
indicating that a rising (declining) spot fuel price results in a higher (lower) marginal cost 
of air travel product 𝑖 and this positive marginal cost effect attenuates with higher hedging 
ratio/proportion. Conversely, 𝛼3𝑖 < 0 when airline 𝑖 has a fuel hedging ratio/proportion, 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖 ∈ (− 𝑎0𝑎1 , 1], indicating that a rising (declining) spot fuel price results in a lower 
(higher) marginal cost of air travel product 𝑖  and this negative marginal cost effect 
intensifies with higher hedging ratio/proportion.25  
It is commonly known that aircraft landings and take-offs use fuel more intensively 
compared to aircraft cruising.26 Air travel products with more intermediate stops add more 
landings and take-offs within a given itinerary; and thus, for a given itinerary flying 
distance, products with fewer intermediate stops use less fuel. As such, it is expected that 
products with fewer intermediate stops will experience a smaller impact on fuel cost at the 
margin when jet fuel price changes. In the marginal cost function, 𝐷𝑖𝑐 captures how the 
marginal cost impact of jet fuel price is associated with product 𝑖’s intermediate stop 
feature. The zero-one indicator variables 𝑑𝑖0, 𝑑𝑖1, 𝑑𝑖2  for intermediate stop feature of 
product 𝑖  are the same as previously defined. 𝛼4 , 𝛼5   and 𝛼6  are the parameters that 
measure the respective marginal effect of jet fuel price on marginal cost associated with 
each of these intermediate stop dummy variables. Consistent with the discussions above 
regarding differing fuel-intensive usage across products with different numbers of 
intermediate stops, these parameters have the following relationship: 𝛼6 > 𝛼5 > 𝛼4 > 0.  
We allow jet fuel price to influence an air travel product’s marginal cost according 
to the product’s actual flying miles, 𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖, simply because longer flying routes 
consume more aviation fuel. Therefore, a fuel-intensive air travel product’s marginal cost 
is likely to be influenced more by jet fuel price fluctuations. The parameter, 𝛼7, measures 
the marginal cost effect of jet fuel price associated with an air travel product’s itinerary 
distance, and it is expected to be positive, i.e., 𝛼7 > 0. 
                                                          
25
 When 𝛼3𝑖 > 0, 𝛼3𝑖 → 0 as 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖 → − 𝑎0𝑎1. When 𝛼3𝑖 < 0, 𝛼3𝑖 decreases away from 0 and becomes more 
negative as 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖 → 1. This specification with respect to the hedging ratio also implies that |𝑎0| < |𝑎1|. 
26
 See http://www.co2offsetresearch.org/aviation/Distance.html 
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Last, equation (11) specifies that jet fuel price, 𝑃𝑓, is influenced by crude oil price, 𝑃𝑐. Through the assumption that parameter 𝜙1 > 0, the effect of fuel price on marginal cost 
translates into the indirect marginal effect of crude oil price on airline’s marginal cost. 
Substituting equations (3) and (8) through (11) into the Nash equilibrium solution 
price equation (7) yields a reduced-form equation for Nash equilibrium price for product 𝑖:    𝑷𝒊∗ = 𝒇(𝛉; 𝑃𝑐, 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖 , 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡, 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 , 𝐷𝑖𝑐 , 𝑛, 𝑛0, 𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑋1, 𝑋2𝑖, 𝑋−2𝑖, 𝑍1, 𝑍2𝑖) 
                (12) 
Where  𝛉 ≡ {𝛽0, 𝛽, ℎ0, ℎ1, ℎ2, ℎ3, ℎ4, ℎ5, ℎ6, 𝛾1, 𝛾2, 𝛿0, 𝛿1, 𝛼0, 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝑎0, 𝑎1, 𝛼4, 𝛼5, 𝛼6, 𝛼7, 𝜙0, 𝜙1} 𝑛 is the total number of air travel products in the relevant origin-destination market; 𝑛0 is 
the total number of air travel products that are non-stop in the relevant origin-destination 
market; 𝑛1 is the total number of air travel products that have one intermediate stop in the 
relevant origin-destination market; and 𝑛2 is the total number of air travel products that 
have two or more intermediate stops in the relevant origin-destination market. The actual 
reduced-form expression for the right-hand-side of equation (12) is reported in the 
appendix of Gayle and Lin (2020).  
 
2.3 Theoretical Analysis 
2.3.1 The impact of crude oil price on airfare: Pass-through Rate  
The marginal effect of crude oil price on a typical air travel product’s price level 
determines the pass-through relationship, which is derived from our theoretical model 
based on the following partial derivative:27 𝝏𝑷𝒊∗𝝏𝑷𝒄   = ?̃?(ℎ4𝑛0+ℎ5𝑛1+ℎ6𝑛2)+[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)𝛽 ̃]𝐷𝑖(2𝛽+𝛽 ̃)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)𝛽 ̃ ] 𝛾𝛿1⏟                     𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 (+) + [2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃]((𝑎0+𝑎1𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖)+𝐷𝑖𝑐+𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖)(2𝛽+𝛽 ̃ )[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)𝛽 ̃ ] 𝛽𝜙1⏟                            𝑫𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 (+/−) +               ?̃? ∑ ((𝑎0+𝑎1𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑗)+𝐷𝑗𝑐+𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗)𝑛−1𝑗≠𝑖 (2𝛽+𝛽 ̃ )[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)𝛽 ̃ ] 𝛽𝜙1⏟                          𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒄 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 (+/−)                    (13) 
where ℎ4𝑛0 + ℎ5𝑛1 + ℎ6𝑛2 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 ;  ∑ 𝛼3𝑗𝑛−1𝑗≠𝑖 = 𝛼−3𝑖 . The above equation suggests 
that changes in crude oil price are translated into changes in airfare through two market 
                                                          
27
 We use the similar definition of cost-price pass-through used in Kim and Cotterill (2008) in page 39. 
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channels: demand-side and supply-side. The following provides intuitive descriptions of 
the demand-side effect, as well as the two supply-side effects.  
 
Demand effect  
The demand effect captures how crude oil price changes affect air travel demand. 
The component in equation (13) that captures this effect is positive, and therefore 
consistent with our previous discussion. An increase (decrease) in crude oil price pushes 
up (down) gasoline price, leading to higher (lower) air travel demand as driving becomes 
relatively more (less) costly. The higher (lower) demand for air travel causes airfare to rise 
(fall). Note that the size of the demand effect depends on the intermediate stop(s) feature 
of the relevant product captured by 𝐷𝑖. Based on our definition of 𝐷𝑖, the demand effect is 
particularly stronger the fewer the number of intermediate stops required by the air travel 
product. This demand-side prediction is consistent with our previous discussion.  
Last, it is evident that the demand effect not only depends on the total number of 
competing products in the relevant market, 𝑛, but also how these competing products break 
down into numbers of non-stop, one intermediate stop, and two or more intermediate stops 
products in the market, i.e., 𝑛0, 𝑛1 and 𝑛2, respectively. Later, we discuss further the pass-
through rate impacts associated with number of competing products.   
Direct cost effect  
The direct cost effect captures the portion of airline 𝑖’s optimal airfare response to 
changes in its own marginal cost, where the marginal cost changes are driven by changes 
in crude oil price. This effect may be positive or negative, depending on the airline’s 
hedging strategy, i.e. the airline’s hedging ratio/proportion. A sufficiently small hedging 
ratio/proportion will yield a positive direct cost effect;28 however, with sufficiently large 
hedging ratio/proportion, 𝛼3𝑖  is negative and can be sufficiently large in magnitude to 
cause a negative direct cost effect. In fact, equation (13) can be used to show that an airline 
can adopt a sufficiently high hedging ratio such that most or even all its fuel usage is hedged, 
resulting in a negative direct cost effect that is sufficiently large to further result in a 
negative pass-through effect from crude oil price changes to its optimal airfare.  
                                                          
28
 In this case, 𝛼3𝑖 could either be positive or negative, but not sufficiently large in magnitude to cause a 
negative direct cost effect. 
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The size of the direct cost effect in equation (13) also depends on the intermediate 
stop(s) feature of the relevant product captured by 𝐷𝑖𝑐 , as well as the itinerary flying 
distance of the relevant product captured by 𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖. Conditional on the itinerary 
flying distance, a positive (negative) direct cost effect becomes weaker (stronger) the fewer 
the number of intermediate stops required by the air travel product. Furthermore, 
conditional on the number of intermediate stop(s) feature of the product, a positive 
(negative) direct cost effect is stronger (weaker) the longer is the itinerary flying distance 
of the air travel product. Last, it is evident that the direct cost effect depends on the total 
number of competing products in the relevant market, 𝑛. 
Strategic cost effect  
The strategic cost effect captures the extent to which airline 𝑖’s optimal airfare 
responds to changes in the marginal cost of rival airlines, where the rival airlines’ marginal 
cost changes are driven by changes in crude oil price. This strategic cost effect results from 
the strategic interdependence across competing oligopolistic firms in a market, a feature of 
our model that results from the assumed Bertrand-Nash price-setting game played between 
airlines. Similar arguments from the analysis of direct cost effect apply to the analysis of 
the strategic cost effect. This effect could be positive or negative, depending on the rival 
firms’ hedging strategies. Due to the strategic interdependence across competing 
oligopolistic airlines, it is important to note that the strategic effect facilitates a positive 
(negative) correlation between an airline’s price level and crude oil price, when the 
strategic cost effect is positive (negative), even in an extreme situation in which the 
airline’s own marginal cost is insensitive to crude oil price changes. The size of the strategic 
cost effect also depends on the intermediate stop(s) feature and the itinerary flying distance 
of rival carrier products, as well as the total number of competing products in the relevant 
market. 
In summary, the demand effect constitutes the demand-side market channel that 
allows changes in crude oil price to be reflected in airfare. The derived pass-through rate 
in equation (13) suggests that it is important to recognize the demand-side market channel 
when modeling the pass-through channels of changes in crude oil price to airfare; and 
neglecting the demand-side channel is tantamount to neglecting a positively related impact 
of crude oil price changes on airfares. Previous literature has focused on the supply-side 
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pass-through from jet fuel price changes to airfare, but neglected the key role of airline fuel 
hedging on the pass-through rate. 29 Our theory suggests that it is essential to consider the 
jet fuel hedging effect when specifying the cost function. According to the derived pass-
through rate in equation (13), a change in crude oil price can positively or negatively 
transmit to the equilibrium airfare, depending on the airline’s and rival airlines’ hedging 
strategies. The fuel hedging effect plays a determining role in influencing the sign of 
supply-side effect and further the sign of the crude oil-airfare pass-through relationship. 30  
2.3.2 Model Predictions 
Table 1 provides some predictions from our theoretical model. Formal derivations 
of each prediction are presented in the appendix of Gayle and Lin (2020). We now provide 
brief discussions of each theoretical prediction listed in Table 1, respectively.  
In an extreme case, suppose airline 𝑖 has 100% of its fuel consumption covered by 
hedging contracts and suppose it hedges directly in jet fuel, i.e., all its fuel procurements 
in the relevant future periods can be done at previously agreed upon “locked-in” fuel prices. 
Consequently, if spot crude oil and fuel prices increase, airline 𝑖 has a cost advantage 
relative to airlines with no or little hedged fuel by being able to procure fuel at previously 
agreed upon “locked-in” fuel price that is lower than spot fuel price. It is reasonable to 
predict airline 𝑖 has an incentive to lower its airfare when the profit margins of its rival 
airlines are shrinking, perhaps to steal market share from rival airlines. In the scenario just 
discussed, the highly fuel-hedged airline 𝑖 decreased its airfare in response to increases in 
spot crude oil and fuel prices, which is consistent with a negative crude oil-airfare pass-
through rate possibility suggested in Prediction 1. On the contrary, in the event that the 
spot crude oil and fuel prices decrease, airline 𝑖 has a cost disadvantage relative to its rival 
airlines; and therefore, it has an incentive to pass along the relative higher cost to 
passengers by raising its airfare. Note that the highly fuel-hedged airline 𝑖 increased its 
airfare in response to decreases in spot crude oil and fuel prices, again a result consistent 
with a negative crude oil-airfare pass-through rate possibility suggested in Prediction 1.  
                                                          
29
 There are a considerable number of studies that focus on how airline fuel hedging strategies affect airlines 
in terms of firms’ market value and risk management [see Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2006a, 2006b), 
Morrell and Swan (2006), and Treanor et. al. (2014)].  
30
 Previously mentioned airline pass-through literature has uniquely found a positive supply-side pass-
through from jet fuel price to airfare; whereas, our theory suggests the supply-side pass-through could be 
positive or negative, depending on airlines’ hedging strategy.  
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Now consider the opposite extreme case in which airline 𝑖 does not use any fuel 
hedging contracts. In this extreme case, airline 𝑖′𝑠 marginal cost fluctuates positively with 
spot crude oil and fuel prices since none of its fuel is hedged against the spot fuel price 
level. Given that a profit-maximizing airline is likely to set airfare in manner that causes 
its airfare to be positively correlated with its own marginal cost, the positive correlation 
between spot crude oil and fuel prices and the airline’s marginal cost in turn results in a 
positive correlation between crude oil price and its airfare, a result consistent with a 
positive crude oil-airfare pass-through rate possibility suggested in Prediction 1. 
Table 1: Some Predictions from our Theoretical Model 
Prediction # Description of Prediction 
Prediction 1 The pass-through from changes in crude oil price to an air travel product’s 
equilibrium airfare can be either positive or negative, depending on the airline’s 
and its rival airlines’ fuel hedging strategies.  
Prediction 2 The magnitude of the pass-through rate from changes in crude oil price to an air 
travel product’s optimal airfare is a decreasing function of the airline’s jet fuel 
hedging ratio, i.e. 
𝝏{𝝏𝑷𝒊∗𝝏𝑷𝒄}𝝏𝑯𝒆𝒅𝒈𝒆𝒊 < 0 ∀𝑖.  
Prediction 3 The magnitude of the pass-through rate from changes in crude oil price to an air 
travel product’s optimal airfare is an increasing function of the product’s itinerary 
flying distance, i.e. 
𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐}𝜕𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 > 0 ∀𝑖. 
Prediction 4 The magnitude of the pass-through rate from changes in crude oil price to an air 
travel product’s equilibrium airfare can be positively or negatively influenced by 
the intensity of market competition, depending on the airline’s and its rival airlines’ 
fuel hedging strategies; and the effect on the pass-through rate is non-linear with 
respect to competition intensity. 
 
Prediction 2 describes a negative relationship between the hedging ratio and the 
magnitude of the pass-through rate. However, depending on whether the pass-through rate 
is negative or positive, this negative relationship means different things for changes in the 
magnitude of the pass-through rate as a firm increases its fuel hedging. Specifically, if an 
airline has a negative crude oil-airfare pass-through rate, then this negative pass-through 
rate is predicted to increase in magnitude as the airline increases the extent of its fuel 
hedging. On the other hand, if an airline has a positive crude oil-airfare pass-through rate, 
then this positive pass-through rate is predicted to decrease in magnitude as the airline 
increases the extent of its fuel hedging.   
Prediction 3 implies that in a given origin-destination market, the greater an air 
travel product’s actual flying distance: (i) the smaller the marginal effect of changing crude 
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oil price on the optimal airfare level when the pass-through rate is negative; and (ii) the 
greater the marginal effect of changing crude oil price on the optimal airfare level when 
the pass-through rate is positive. The underlying intuition follows from the fact that 
products with longer flying routes use jet fuel more intensively. For airlines with no or little 
fuel hedging, and consequently a positive crude oil-airfare pass-through rate, a rising 
(falling) crude oil price induces greater increase (decrease) in marginal cost of products 
with longer flying routes, and thus a greater direct positive pass-on effect on the price level 
of these products. For airlines with a sufficiently large hedging ratio and consequently a 
negative crude oil-airfare pass-through rate, on the one hand, during time periods when 
crude oil price increases, the relative cost advantage of highly fuel-hedged airlines is 
lessened due to the extra fuel needed on longer flying routes, inducing a smaller reduction 
in airfare on longer itinerary routes. On the other hand, during time periods when crude oil 
price drops, the relative cost disadvantage of highly fuel-hedged airlines is again lessened 
due to the extra fuel needed on longer routes, inducing a smaller increase in airfare on 
longer itinerary routes.   
Prediction 4 tells us that the magnitude of the crude oil-airfare pass-through rate is 
influenced by the level of market competition, where the level of market competition is 
measured in our theoretical model from the following three perspectives: (i) the total 
number of air travel products in the relevant market that use non-stop itinerary, 𝑛0; (ii) the 
total number of air travel products in the relevant market that have one intermediate stop, 𝑛1; and (iii) the total number of air travel products in the relevant market that have two or 
more intermediate stops, 𝑛2. We believe it is reasonable to use the above three measures, 
as products within each of the three classifications are considered to be closer substitutes 
with each other; and therefore, this disaggregated method of measuring competition should 
be more informative compared to using total number of products in a market without regard 
for the intermediate stop features of the products.  
Prediction 4 suggests that increased market competition can either encourage or 
discourage an airline’s pass-through behavior depending on airlines’ fuel hedging 
strategies; and this effect is non-linear with respect to the competition intensity. 
Specifically, our theory predicts that when airline 𝑖 is “heavily hedged” yielding a negative 
pass-through rate, increases in market competition intensifies the negative pass-through 
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rate, i.e. pushing the negative pass-through rate further away from zero. However, if airline 𝑖  is “moderately hedged” and has a negative pass-through rate, increases in market 
competition attenuates the negative pass-through rate, i.e. pushing the negative pass-
through rate closer to zero. 
Last, for airlines with no or little fuel hedging and a positive pass-through rate, 
increases in market competition intensifies the positive pass-through rate, i.e. pushing the 
positive pass-through rate further away from zero. Intuitively, an airline that is exposed to 
crude oil cost shocks (positive or negative) would quickly adjust its optimal price, holding 
the belief that its rivals will react similarly to the cost shock. As such, a cost shock is likely 
to pass-through into new equilibrium prices on a larger scale as these airlines’ profit 
margins shrink when markets become more competitive. This interpretation complies with 
the argument made by Koopmans and Lieshout (2016) and Malina et. al. (2012) that when 
markets become more competitive, profits margins decline, which leaves little room for 
airlines to absorb costs without passing through cost changes to prices. 31  
The impact of market competition on the magnitude of the pass-through rate is 
determined by two distinct sources: demand-side and supply-side. On the demand side, an 
air travel product with fewer intermediate stops is associated with shorter overall flying 
time, and thus, is viewed as a closer substitute to driving, ceteris paribus. When crude oil 
price increases (decreases), causing an increase (decrease) in ground transport cost for 
driving, the demand for air travel products with fewer intermediate stops experiences a 
greater increase (decrease). This larger demand effect for products with fewer intermediate 
stops occur because ℎ4 > ℎ5 > ℎ6 ≥ 0 . Therefore, the demand-side positive effect of 
market competition on the pass-through rate is expected to be the greatest when market 
competition is measured by 𝑛0, and the smallest when market competition is measured by 𝑛2.  
On the supply side, an air travel product with fewer intermediate stops is associated 
with fewer numbers of landings and take-offs; and these two stages of a flight have the 
highest fuel-burn rates. For airlines that are not completely hedged, when crude oil price 
increases (decreases), which results in higher (lower) jet fuel expenses associated with 
                                                          
31
 Neither of the two papers considers the potential effect of jet fuel hedging strategy on airlines’ pass-through 
from jet fuel price changes to airfare.  
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those unhedged fuel usage, the marginal cost of products that have more intermediate stops 
experiences a greater increase (decrease) compared to products that have fewer 
intermediate stops. This effect is captured by the previously posited parameter ranking: 𝛼6 > 𝛼5 > 𝛼4 > 0. Therefore, for an airline travel product 𝑖, we may expect the supply-
side effect is the greatest when market competition is measured by 𝑛2, and the smallest 
when market competition is measured by 𝑛0. Therefore, the ranking of the supply-side 
effects across products with different numbers of intermediate stops is the reverse of the 
ranking of the demand-side effects. 
The impact of market distance on the pass-through rate 
Our theory suggests that consumer preference between air travel and private 
automobile travel depends on the relative transport cost that the consumer faces between 
the two modes of transportation, and the relative transport cost is influenced by the distance 
between the origin and destination. The overall effect of market distance on the crude oil-
airfare pass-through rate can be split into two effects: “level effect” and “elasticity effect”. 
The “Level Effect” 
The “level effect” measures the extent to which market distance affects airlines’ 
optimal adjustment of their airfares in response to changing crude oil price, where the 
optimal adjustment is driven by the likelihood of consumers switching between air travel 
and private automobile travel. In a market where the two endpoints are relatively close to 
each other within a certain threshold distance, automobile travel is a preferred 
transportation mode to air travel. When crude oil price (and gasoline price) increases, 
switching from automobile to air travel in this case becomes more likely as market distance 
increases, resulting in a greater increase in air travel demand. The increase in air travel 
demand, and thus airfare, get larger as market distance increases, suggesting a positive 
“level effect”. When the two endpoints become even further apart beyond a certain 
threshold distance, air travel is a more ideal option as automobile is no longer realistic in 
very long distance markets, making switching modes of transport increasingly less likely 
with rising crude oil price. The increase in air travel demand and thus airfare get smaller 
as market distance increases beyond the threshold distance, suggesting a negative “level 
effect”.  
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The size of the “level effect” depends on the intermediate stop(s) feature of the 
relevant product. In particular, the absolute magnitude of the “level effect” is larger the 
fewer the number of intermediate stops required by the air travel product. This demand-
side prediction is consistent with our previous discussion.  
The “Elasticity Effect” 
The “elasticity effect” measures the extent to which market distance affects an 
airline’s optimal airfare response to crude oil price changes based on consumers’ 
sensitivities to changes of airfare. The intuition is that short-distance travelers tend to be 
more sensitive to airfare changes than long-distance travelers, simply because driving is 
often not a realistic alternative to air travel in long-distance markets. As such, we expect 
airlines that are significantly exposed to jet fuel price fluctuations, i.e. airlines with little or 
no fuel hedging, to pass along a crude oil induced cost shock to airfare more heavily to 
long-distance air travelers given their less elastic air travel demand compared to short-
distance travelers. However, for airlines that are engaged in some jet fuel hedging plans, 
the pass-on effect can be positively or negatively correlated with market distance. The sign 
of the “elasticity effect” is determined by airlines’ jet fuel hedging strategy along with 
airlines’ incentive to pass-on any cost changes due to a potential growing price insensitivity 
of passengers; and the size of this effect exhibits a non-linear pattern with market distance. 
Table 2 summarizes predictions from our theoretical model regarding the overall 
effect of market distance on the crude oil-airfare pass-through rate. The table shows that 
for scenarios (i), (v) and (vi), the overall effect of market distance on the pass-through rate 
depends on the relative countervailing strengths of the “level effect” and the “elasticity 
effect”. However, our theoretical model yields unambiguous predictions under scenarios 
(ii), (iii) and (iv). For scenario (ii), the negative pass-through rate increases toward 0 (i.e. 
decreases in magnitude) as market distance increases. For scenario (iii), the positive pass-
through rate increases away from 0 (i.e. increases in magnitude) as market distance 
increases. For scenario (iv), the negative pass-through rate decreases away from 0 (i.e. 
increases in magnitude) as market distance increases. 
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Table 2: Predicted Impacts of Market Distance on the Crude Oil-Airfare Pass-through Rate 
Market 
Distance Scenario 
Airline 𝒊′𝒔 
Hedging 
Ratio 
Pass-
through 
Rate 
Level 
Effect 
Elasticity 
Effect 
Overall Effect of Market 
Distance on Pass-through rate 
Relatively 
Short 
(i) 
Relatively 
Large 
 
Negative Positive Negative Depends on relative strengths of level & elasticity effects. 
(ii) Moderate Negative Positive Positive 
Positive: The negative pass-
through rate increases toward 0 
(i.e. decreases in magnitude) as 
market distance increases. 
(iii) 
Relatively 
Low 
 
Positive Positive Positive 
Positive: The positive pass-
through rate increases away 
from 0 (i.e. increases in 
magnitude) as market distance 
increases. 
Relatively 
Long 
(iv) 
Relatively 
Large 
 
Negative Negative Negative 
Negative: The negative pass-
through rate decreases away 
from 0 (i.e. increases in 
magnitude) as market distance 
increases. 
(v) Moderate Negative Negative Positive Depends on relative strengths of level & elasticity effects. 
(vi) Relatively Low Positive Negative Positive 
Depends on relative strengths of 
level & elasticity effects. 
Notes: Formal parameter restrictions from our theory that define the hedging ratios categories of “Relatively 
Large”, “Moderate” and “Relative Low”, as well as parameter restrictions from our theory that define the 
market distance categories of “Relatively Short” and “Relatively Long” can be found in Gayle and Lin (2020).    
 
 
3. Empirical Analysis  
 We now analyze whether these theoretical predictions are supported by systematic 
patterns across a sample of U.S. domestic origin-destination air travel markets. We start by 
describing the data sample and then describe the empirical models used for analyzing the 
data, followed by a discussion of results from the empirical models.  
3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
Our empirical analysis focuses on U.S. domestic coach-class airline tickets over the 
period 2013Q3 to 2015Q4. 32 This time period spans relatively substantial fluctuations in 
                                                          
32
 Before this sample period, American Airlines (AA) and US Airways (US) announced plans to merge in 
February 2013, but the proposed merger was challenged by the Department of Justice in August 2013, and 
settled in November 2013. We assume that the price effects of the merger was realized when it was announced 
in the beginning of 2013. As such, our analysis of airfares during our sample period, which begins in the third 
quarter of 2013, avoids the potential undue influence of this merger. The argument here is similar to the 
statement that Kim and Singal (1993) made in their study that “exercise of market power does not have to 
wait until merger completion…even without an explicit price-fixing agreement, the mere anticipation of a 
merger would make the participating firms more cooperative.” 
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crude oil price; these fluctuations are important for empirical identification of the 
relationships between changes in crude oil price and airfares, which is key to achieve the 
primary objectives of the analysis. The sample is constructed in the similar manner as in 
Gayle and Thomas (2015, 2016) and Gayle and Yimga (2018). Airline ticket information 
data represent 10% of all domestic tickets issued by airlines and are obtained from the 
DB1B database.33  
A market is defined as a directional pair of an origin and a destination airport. For 
example, air travel for which the origin is Atlanta and the destination is Boston is in a 
different market than air travel for which the origin is Boston and the destination is Atlanta. 
This definition allows for the characteristics of the origin city to affect consumers’ air travel 
demand.  
A product is defined as a unique combination of itinerary and operating carrier. For 
example, one product in the Atlanta to Boston market is a non-stop flight from Atlanta to 
Boston operated by American Airlines. We focus on products that use a single operating 
carrier34 for all segments of a given itinerary, i.e. pure online products. Product price and 
quantity sold are obtained by averaging the market fare and aggregating the number of 
passengers, respectively, according to our definition of product. Thus, in the collapsed data, 
a product is a unique observation during a given time period. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics. There are 603,745 observations across 147,073 
markets. The variable, Hedge, measures the proportion of an airline’s aviation fuel 
consumption protected by hedging contracts relative to the airline’s total projected annual 
aviation fuel usage, reported in airlines’ 10-K annual reports.35 Across all airlines over the 
                                                          
33
 The DB1B data do not contain passenger-specific information and some important elements of product 
differentiation, such as departure times, how far in advance the ticket is purchased, and length-of-stay, etc. 
Following Brueckner and Spiller (1994) and Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006), we keep only round-trip 
itineraries within the continental U.S. with at most four segments (i.e. no more than three intermediate stops). 
We eliminate all itineraries with market fares less than $50 or greater than $2,000. We relax this rule when 
creating the entry threat variables (denoted by EntryThreat) used in the regression analysis in order to 
accurately calculate the level of potential competition. 
34
 There are 21 relevant carriers in our sample, including American, Alaska, JetBlue, Delta, ExpressJet, 
Frontier, AirTran, Allegiant, GoJet, Hawaiian, Spirit, SkyWest, Chautauqua, Shuttle America, Sun Country, 
United, US Airways, Virgin, Southwest, Mesa, and MidWest. These air carriers include those that provide 
air travel services in the data sample, as well as those that place an entry threat to market incumbent carriers 
without actually serving the relevant market. 
35
 For example, Southwest Airlines’ 10-K annual report in 2012 (filed on 12/31/2012) projected its average 
percent of estimated fuel consumption covered by fuel derivative contracts at varying WTI/Brent crude oil-
equivalent price levels was about 15% for 2013, 50% for 2014, and 30% for 2015. However, the actual 
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sample period, the value of Hedge varies from 0% to 50%, with an average of 15.3%. The 
variable, 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , represents the average jet fuel hedging ratio of an airline’s competitors 
in an origin-destination market. Therefore, in principle and practice, variable 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
varies across airlines in a given origin-destination market since each airline has its own 
unique set of rivals in the market. The average rival fuel-hedging ratio in the data is 13.4%. 
The information regarding itinerary’s actual flying miles is represented by ItineraryDist, 
while Mkt_Dist represents the market non-stop flight distance.  
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Airfare* (dollars) 267.926 108.127 49.737 1,974.787 
Crude Oil Price* (dollars/barrel) 81.479 27.134 43.321 112.004 
Jet Fuel Price* (cents/gallon) 233.415 64.656 136.877 302.898 
Gasoline Price* (cents/gallon) 307.058 53.233 225.211 374.604 
Quantity (number of passengers per product) 79.753 375.325 1 10,294 
Hedge** (%) 15.271 9.957 0 50 HedgeC̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (%) 13.368 8.974 0 50 
ItineraryDist: Itinerary flying distance (miles) 1,688.516   709.15 70    5,382 
Mkt_Dist: Non-stop flight distance (miles) 1,414.865 636.442 70 2,783 
N_nonstop 1.371 1.357 0 7 
N_onestop 9.45 8.379 0 47 
N_twostop 2.381 4.202 0 39 
EntryThreat 1.36 1.185 0 11 
Interstop 1.01 0.503 0 3 
Inconvenience 1.244 0.308 1 3.732 
Origin_Presence 28.701 25.745 0 128 
Dest_Presence 26.908 24.997 0 126 
Population 1,436,077 1,740,341 5,292.955 9,449,256 
Number of Observations 603,745 
Number of Markets 147,073 
* Inflation-adjusted in 2014 dollar. Energy prices are obtained from EIA. ** We are not able to find the 
hedging information for the following five airlines: F9, EV, OO, SY, and YV. Therefore, we exclude those 
observations that have missing hedging ratio, leading to a total of 603,745 observations. 
 
Guided by our theory, N_nonstop counts the number of all competing non-stop 
products offered in a market; N_onestop counts the number of all competing one-stop 
products offered in a market; and N_twostop counts the number of all competing two-or-
more-stops products offered in a market. Following Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) and 
Gayle and Wu (2013), variable EntryThreat captures the extent of potential competition 
incumbent carriers of a relevant market faces. The variable counts the number of all distinct 
                                                          
percentage of hedged fuel consumption was adjusted to be 20% for 2014 based on 2013’s 10-K (filed on 
12/31/2013) and 0% for 2015 based on 2014’s 10-K (filed on 12/31/2014).  
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carriers that are present at both endpoints of a market without actually offering an air travel 
product between the two endpoint cities. These variables are jointly used to control for the 
impact of market structure factors on equilibrium airfares, as well as their impact on the 
size of crude oil-airfare pass-through. 
Carriers may offer both non-stop and connecting service in a market. Consumers 
likely value the two types of products differently. Variable Interstop is used as one measure 
of travel inconvenience of an itinerary, as it counts the number of intermediate stops of the 
itinerary. We also use variable Inconvenience as an additional measure of an itinerary’s 
travel inconvenience resulting from the location(s) of the intermediate stops. 36  The 
argument is that there may be products that have the same number of intermediate stops in 
an origin-destination market; but because the location(s) of the intermediate stop airport(s) 
are different for the products, their associated itinerary flying distance will differ and thus 
exhibit different relative routing qualities.  
We use two different measures of the size of airlines’ airport presence, 
Origin_Presence and Dest_Presence, similar to the airport presence variables in Berry 
(1990).37 To control for the likelihood that larger markets have greater demand for air travel 
service, we use as a measure of market size the geometric mean of the population estimates, 
Population, in 2014, following Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006). 
 
3.2 Reduced-form Regression Analysis 
According to our theory, we argue that there exists a positive or negative pass-
through relationship from changes in crude oil price to airline market fare, and the sign and 
size of this pass-through is influenced by some airline-specific and market-specific 
characteristics. To empirically analyze the relevant relationships suggested by our theory, 
                                                          
36
 Variable Inconvenience is computed by dividing the itinerary miles flown from the origin to the destination 
by the market non-stop radian distance. This variable is similar in spirit to the “Cost” variable used by 
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), in which the authors divide the difference between the itinerary flying miles and 
the non-stop distance by the non-stop distance between a market’s endpoints. See also Chen and Gayle (2019), 
Gayle and Wu (2015), and Gayle and Le (2015). 
37
 Refer to Berry (1990) for detailed discussion on this topic.  
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and consistent with many empirical analyses of pass-through, we use the following log-
linear reduced-form regression model: 38 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡) = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) + 𝜃2𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝜃3𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ +𝜃4 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝜃5 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ +𝜃6 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚) + 𝜃7 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚) +𝜃8𝑁_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃9 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝑁_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 +𝜃10 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝑁_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝜃11 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝑁_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 ×𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ +𝜃12𝑁_𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃13 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝑁_𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 +𝜃14 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝑁_𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝜃15 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝑁_𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ +𝜃16𝑁_𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃17 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝑁_𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 +𝜃18 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝑁_𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝜃19 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝑁_𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ +θ20𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃21 log(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑡 +𝜃22 log(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑡 × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝜃23 log(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑡 × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ +𝜃24 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚) + 𝜃25 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚) +𝜃26 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚) × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝜃27 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚) × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ +𝜃28𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛_𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃29 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛_𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑡 +𝜃30𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃31 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑐,𝑡) × 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑡 +𝜃32𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃33𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃34 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑡) +𝜂𝑦 + 𝜂𝑞 + 𝜂𝑎 + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑚 + 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑡        (14) 
The dependent variable is the air travel product price level in logs. The model 
includes year and quarter fixed effects (𝜂𝑦, 𝜂𝑞), air carrier fixed effects (𝜂𝑎), origin airport 
fixed effects (𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑚), and destination airport fixed effects (𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚). In the log-log linear 
reduced-form regression specification, the coefficient associated with the logarithm of 
crude oil price (𝜃1) is a measure of the pass-through elasticity, i.e. the percent change in 
airfare due to a percent change in crude oil price. Coefficients associated with the 
interactions between the logarithm of crude oil price with other market-level and firm-level 
variables capture the extent to which the pass-through elasticity is influenced by the 
                                                          
38
 See similar log-log linear reduced-form specifications used in Hellerstein and Villas-Boas (2010) on page 
175, Kim and Cotterill (2008) on page 45, Goldberg and Knetter (1996) on page 6. In addition, we believe a 
reduced-form regression analysis in this particular study is sufficient to address our research questions. In 
future research we plan to consider a structural approach to deepen the analysis.   
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relevant market-level or firm-level characteristic. According to equation (14), the crude 
oil-airfare pass-through rate (denoted by 𝑃𝑇𝑅) is derived as follows:  𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝜕 log(𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝜕 log(𝑃𝑐𝑡) = 𝜃1 + 𝜃4𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝜃5𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜃7 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚) + 𝜃9𝑁_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 +𝜃10𝑁_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 ×𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝜃11𝑁_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜃13𝑁_𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃14𝑁_𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 ×𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝜃15𝑁_𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜃17𝑁_𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃18𝑁_𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡 +𝜃19𝑁_𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 ×𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜃21𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃22𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑡 × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡 +𝜃23𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑡 × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜃25 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚) + 𝜃26 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚) × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡 +𝜃27 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑚) × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑡𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜃29𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛_𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑡 + 𝜃31𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑡     (15) 
 
Table 4 presents the results for the reduced-form regression estimated by ordinary 
least squares. 39  The top panel of the table presents the key pass-through parameter 
estimates in equation (15), while the coefficient estimates of other control variables are 
reported in the bottom panel. Except the coefficient estimates for N_onestop and 
logPopulation, the coefficient estimates for all other control variables in the bottom panel 
of the table have expected signs, and are statistically significant at conventional levels of 
statistical significance.40 The pass-through parameter estimates reported in the top panel of 
the table are all statistically significant at conventional levels of statistical significance. 
Consistent with the primary objectives of this research, the subsequent discussion focuses 
on interpreting the key coefficient estimates in the top panel.  
Guided by equation (15), the coefficient estimate, 𝜃1̂, reveals that the crude oil-
airfare pass-through elasticity is 0.37 if all other explanatory variables are set to be zero. 
However, note that it is unlikely that all explanatory variables are simultaneously zero. As 
                                                          
39
 The variables that measure the number of products offered in the market, N_nonstop, N_onestop, and 
N_twostop, are likely endogenous. We mitigate this endogeneity concern by including in the regression 
airline-specific fixed effects as well as time, origin airport, destination airport fixed effects. Consistent with 
discussions in Nevo (2000), brand-specific (here, airline-specific) dummy variables capture the 
characteristics that do not vary by market, as well as the mean product-specific unobserved components, 
which serve to mitigate correlation between the error term in the reduced-form regression with N_nonstop, 
N_onestop, and N_twostop. We acknowledge that using strong instruments are ideal for fully addressing the 
endogeneity concern. Unfortunately, strong instruments are difficult to find in our empirical setting. As such, 
our second best is to rely on the above-listed fixed effects to mitigate the endogeneity problem.    
40
 Many of these coefficient estimates are consistent with results from the use of similar control variables in 
previous studies. For example, our coefficient estimates for Mkt_Dist yield qualitatively similar results found 
in Brueckner, Dyer and Spiller (1992) and Brueckner and Spiller (1994); similarly for coefficient estimates 
on “airport presence” variables used in our study and in Berry (1990), Borenstein (1989), and Morrison and 
Winston (1989).  
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such, one way to proceed with interpreting the empirical results is to compute the marginal 
effect of each explanatory variable on the pass-through elasticity assuming the other 
explanatory variables are set equal to their sample means, respectively.  
We find that the mean marginal effect of jet fuel hedging on the crude-oil airfare 
pass-through rate is -0.005 when relevant explanatory variables are set equal to their 
sample means. 41  The interpretation of the negative mean marginal effect is twofold 
according to our theory. On the one hand, if the typical air travel product initially has a 
positive pass-through rate, the crude oil-airfare pass-through elasticity is expected to 
decline by 0.005 in magnitude for every 1% increase in the relevant airline’s jet fuel 
hedging ratio. On the other hand, if the typical air travel product initially has a negative 
pass-through rate, the negative crude oil-airfare pass-through elasticity is expected to 
increase in magnitude (i.e. move further away from zero) by 0.005 for every 1% increase 
in the relevant airline’s jet fuel hedging ratio. The negative relationship between the pass-
through rate and jet fuel hedging validates our theoretical predictions described in 
Prediction 2 in Table 1.  
The coefficient estimate for the interaction of logarithm crude oil price with 
logarithm air travel product itinerary distance is positive. If the typical air travel product 
initially has positive pass-through rate/elasticity, the marginal effect estimate suggests that 
the positive pass-through elasticity will further increase by a mean 0.0384 with each 1% 
increase in the product’s itinerary flying distance. However, if the typical air travel product 
initially has negative pass-through rate/elasticity, the marginal effect estimate suggests that 
the negative pass-through elasticity will decrease (i.e. move toward zero) by a mean 0.0384 
with each 1% increase in the product’s itinerary flying distance. This empirically estimated 
positive relationship between a product’s pass-through rate and its itinerary flying distance 
is indeed consistent with the theoretical predictions described in Prediction 3 in Table 1. 
      
  
                                                          
41
 
𝜕𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑖𝜕𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 |𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 = −0.00691 + 0.000059𝑁_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 0.0000128𝑁_𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 0.00000828𝑁_𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −0.0000452𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 0.0003 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) = −0.005  
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Table 4: Reduced-form Airfare Regression Model Estimated by Ordinary Least Squares  
                     Dependent Variable: logP 
  
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Standard Errors of 
Coefficient Estimates 
logPc (𝜃1̂) 0.37*** (0.0251) 
logPc×Hedge (𝜃4̂) -0.00691*** (0.000234) 
logPc× 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (𝜃5̂) -0.00389*** (0.000213) 
logPc×logItineraryDist (𝜃7̂)   0.0384*** (0.00506) 
logPc×N_nonstop (𝜃9̂)      0.0122*** (0.00168) 
logPc×N_nonstop×Hedge (𝜃10̂) 0.000059*** (0.0000104) 
logPc×N_nonstop× 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (𝜃11̂) -0.0000531*** (0.0000164) 
logPc×N_onestop (𝜃13̂)     -0.000639* (0.000347) 
logPc×N_onestop×Hedge (𝜃14̂) 0.0000128*** (0.00000207) 
logPc×N_onestop× 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (𝜃15̂) 0.0000077** (0.00000334) 
logPc×N_twostop (𝜃17̂)      0.0015*** (0.000522) 
logPc×N_twostop×Hedge (𝜃18̂) -0.00000828*** (0.00000314) 
logPc×N_twostop× 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (𝜃19̂) 0.0000228*** (0.00000502) 
logPc×EntryThreat (𝜃21̂)   0.012*** (0.00124) 
logPc×EntryThreat ×Hedge (𝜃22̂) -0.0000452*** (0.00000915) 
logPc×EntryThreat × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (𝜃23̂) -0.0000572*** (0.00000912) 
logPc×logMkt_Dist (𝜃25̂)    -0.0921*** (0.00528) 
logPc×logMkt_Dist×Hedge (𝜃26̂) 0.0003*** (0.0000251) 
logPc×logMkt_Dist× 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (𝜃27̂) 0.000562*** (0.0000220) 
logPc×Origin_Presence (𝜃29̂)          -0.000371*** (0.0000494) 
logPc×Dest_Presence (𝜃31̂)        -0.000375*** (0.0000504) 
Hedge (𝜃2̂)               0.019*** (0.000632) 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (𝜃3̂) -0.00123* (0.000651) 
logItineraryDist (𝜃6̂)         -0.306*** (0.0257) 
logMkt_Dist (𝜃24̂)          0.814*** (0.0257) 
N_nonstop (𝜃8̂)            -0.0658*** (0.00622) 
N_onestop (𝜃12̂)           0.00164 (0.00127) 
N_twostop (𝜃16̂)           -0.00985*** (0.00189) 
EntryThreat (𝜃20̂)        -0.0393*** (0.00485) 
Origin_Presence (𝜃28̂)                      0.00532*** (0.000216) 
Dest_Presence (𝜃30̂)                  0.00534*** (0.000221) 
Interstop (𝜃32̂)           0.0497*** (0.000873) 
Inconvenience (𝜃33̂)        0.339*** (0.00898) 
logPopulation (𝜃34̂)               0.000269 (0.00135) 
Constant (𝜃0̂)                1.399*** (0.106) 
N                    603,745 𝑅2                 0.402 
F                    673.5 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Regression includes year, quarter, airline, 
origin airport, destination airport fixed effects.  
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Guided by our theory model, we include two-way interaction variables between the 
logarithm of crude oil price and each of the four competition measures, as well as three-
way interaction variables created by interacting the two-way interaction variables with fuel 
hedging ratio variables. Setting hedging variables equal to their respective sample means, 
we obtain the marginal effects of each competition variable on the crude oil-airfare pass-
through rate. With hedging ratio variables set equal to their respective sample means, we 
find that additional market entry of non-stop, one-intermediate-stop, and two-or-more 
intermediate stop products marginally affects the crude oil-airfare pass-through elasticity 
by a mean 0.012, -0.00034, and 0.0017, respectively, while an additional entry threat 
marginally affects the crude oil-airfare pass-through elasticity by a mean 0.0105.42  
The empirical results suggest that an additional non-stop product offered in the 
market raises the pass-through elasticity by a mean 0.012. According to our previous 
discussions of Prediction 4 from our theory, this positive marginal effect of competition 
on the pass-through rate is predicted to occur when airline jet fuel hedging is at a moderate 
or low level. At moderate jet fuel hedging levels and a negative pass-through elasticity, the 
negative pass-through elasticity is pushed closer to 0 by 0.012 with each additional non-
stop product offered in the market. However, at sufficiently low jet fuel hedging levels and 
a positive pass-through elasticity, the positive pass-through elasticity is pushed further way 
from 0 by 0.012 with each additional non-stop product offered in the market. Consistent 
with our theory, similar qualitative empirical results hold for the market entry of products 
with two or more intermediate stops, but with weaker marginal effects since 0.0017 < 0.012. 
The estimated negative mean marginal effect (-0.00034) on the pass-through 
elasticity associated with the market entry of an additional one-stop product suggests that 
the increasingly intense market competition measured by the number of one-stop air travel 
products encourages those airlines with heavily hedged fuel plans to lower (raise) their 
airfares in response to increasing (declining) crude oil price as their relative cost advantage 
increases (decreases).  
Guided by our theory model, we include a two-way interaction between the 
logarithm of crude oil price and market distance, as well as a three-way interaction of the 
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𝜕𝑃𝑇𝑅𝜕𝑁_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 |𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 0.012; 𝜕𝑃𝑇𝑅𝜕𝑁_𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 |𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ,   𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = −0.00034; 𝜕𝑃𝑇𝑅𝜕𝑁𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 |𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ,   𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =0.0017; 𝜕𝑃𝑇𝑅𝜕𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 |𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ,   𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.0105.  
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two-way interaction with fuel hedging ratios. The mean marginal effect is -0.08 with fuel 
hedging ratio variables set equal to their respective sample means.43 This finding suggests 
a negative correlation between the market distance and the crude oil-airfare pass-through 
rate. According to Table 2, the negative relationship between the pass-through rate and 
market distance suggests two things. First, when market distance is relatively short, the 
“level effect” is positive, and therefore the negative relationship only occurs when the 
“elasticity effect” is negative, which at short market distances requires airlines that are 
heavily fuel hedged as characterized by scenario (i) in Table 2, and dominates the “level 
effect”. Second, when market distance is relatively long, the “level effect” is negative, and 
therefore a negative relationship can occur at any level of jet fuel hedging, i.e. fuel hedging 
ratios can lie in any of the three ranges characterized by scenarios (iv), (v), and (vi) in Table 
2. However, the negative “level effect” needs to dominate a positive “elasticity effect” in 
the case of moderate and low levels of fuel hedging, i.e. hedging ratios satisfying scenarios 
(v) or (vi) in Table 2.  
By interacting the size of airlines’ airport presence with logarithm crude oil price, 
we allow the sizes of airlines’ origin and destination airport presence to influence the crude 
oil-airfare pass-through differently. The coefficient estimates for the two interaction terms, 𝜃29̂  and 𝜃31̂ , suggest the size of airlines’ airport presence have a similar negative and 
statistically significant effect on the pass-through elasticity. If a typical product initially 
has a positive pass-through, greater airport presence tends to reduce the positive pass-
through elasticity; if a typical product initially has a negative pass-through, greater airport 
presence tends to increase the magnitude of the negative pass-through elasticity. 
A closer look at the product-level pass-through rate 
According to equation (15), we further compute the estimated crude oil-airfare 
pass-through rate/elasticity for each product using the information in Table 4, and report 
the summary statistics in Table 5. In column (1), we summarize the estimated product-level 
pass-through rate assuming all determinants of the pass-through rate, including the effect 
of hedging, are taken into account. The summary statistics in this column reveal a negative 
mean crude oil-airfare pass-through rate/elasticity of -0.065, suggesting that a 1% decline 
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𝜕𝑃𝑇𝑅𝜕 log(𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡) |𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ,𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = −0.08. 
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in the crude oil price results in a mean 0.065 percent increase in airfares. While not all 
products in the sample have negative estimated crude oil-airfare pass-through rates, the 
vast majority (approximately 86.7%) do.  
Table 5: Summary Statistics of Estimated Product-level Crude oil-Airfare Pass-through Rate 
  
Estimated 
Product-level 
Pass-through 
Rate 
(1) 
 
Estimated Product-level 
Pass-through Rate when 
we counterfactually shut 
down the influence of 
airline fuel hedging 
(2) 
 
Estimated Product-level 
Pass-through Rate when we 
counterfactually shut down 
the influences of airline fuel 
hedging and market distance 
(3) 
Mean -0.065  0.0045  0.66 
 
(0.00007)  (0.000054)  (0.000039) 
Median -0.0725  -0.00075  0.661 
10th percentile -0.128  -0.0446  0.623 
25th percentile -0.106  -0.0265  0.640 
75th percentile -0.028  0.0305  0.682 
95th percentile 0.033  0.0803  0.712 
Std. Dev. 0.054  0.042  0.030 
Percentage of 
Products with 
Negative Estimated 
Pass-through Rate   
86.7%  50.7%  0% 
Notes: Standard errors of the means are in parentheses for the mean pass-through rates. 
 
The regression results do reveal that a negative crude oil-airfare pass-through rate 
is associated with sufficiently strong airline fuel hedging, having large airport presence, 
and servicing long distance markets. Among these determinants of a negative crude oil-
airfare pass-through rate, the empirical estimates suggest that airline hedging and long-
distance markets are the strongest. However, if we counterfactually set to zero the influence 
of airline hedging on the crude oil-airfare pass-through rate, then the mean pass-through 
rate/elasticity across products in our sample is positive and equal to 0.0045, suggesting that 
a 10% decline in the crude-oil price would have resulted in a mean 0.045% decrease in 
airfares. Counterfactually shutting down the influence of airline hedging yields a positive 
crude oil-airfare pass-through rate among nearly half (49.3%) of the products in our sample, 
as shown in column (2). If in addition, we counterfactually set to zero the influence of 
market distance on the crude oil-airfare pass-through rate, then the mean predicted pass-
through rate is 0.66, with 100% of the products in our sample having a positive crude oil-
airfare pass-through rate, as shown in column (3). 
The results and discussion above do reveal airline fuel hedging is a strong 
contributor to negative crude oil-airfare pass-through rates. Why might this make economic 
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sense? Airlines engage in fuel price hedging by the use of financial instruments to “lock 
in” fuel prices over a certain period. While this practice is beneficial to airlines as a source 
of falling relative fuel cost during periods of rising fuel spot price, it becomes a source of 
increasing relative fuel cost during periods of falling fuel spot price. In other words, the 
increasing relative fuel cost of airlines that are more extensively locked into fuel hedging 
contracts during periods of falling fuel spot price, and these airlines decreasing relative fuel 
cost during periods of rising fuel spot price, can result in optimal airfares for these airlines 
moving counter to changes in fuel spot price, which would yield a negative crude oil-airfare 
pass-through rate. Our empirical analysis suggests that airfares moving counter to changes 
in fuel spot price is a systematic occurrence in the data, and the occurrences are most 
strongly associated with airlines’ fuel price hedging and relatively long-distance markets.  
       Figure 2: Relationships between estimated Product-level Pass-through Rate and Fuel Hedging Ratios 
 
Figure 2 plots the relationship between estimated product-level pass-through rate 
(measured on the vertical axis) and airlines’ hedging ratios (measured on the horizontal 
axis). The downward sloping solid line in the plot represents the best-fit linear regression 
line between the variables measured on the axes of the graph; while the horizontal dashed 
line delineates zero pass-through rate on the diagram. This plot empirically confirms the 
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negative relationship between crude oil-airfare pass-through rate and the jet fuel hedging 
ratio, suggested by Prediction 2 in Table 1; and it also shows most air travel products in 
the data sample have a negative pass-through rate. 
To further investigate the empirical relationship between pass-through rate 
estimates and market distance, we compute mean model-predicted product-level pass-
through rates by market distance groups with the bin width of 50 miles. In Figure 3, we 
plot the empirical relationship between the two with mean model-predicted pass-through 
rates on the vertical axis and market distance bands on the horizontal axis. The downward 
sloping solid curve in the plot represents the best-fit polynomial regression line between 
the variables measured on the axes of the graph. First, Figure 3 reveals that the computed 
average pass-through rates over the market distance bands are mostly negative, especially 
for market distances beyond 350 miles. Second, the plot confirms a negative relationship 
between the mean pass-through rate and market distance. These observations suggest that 
as market distance increases up to approximately 350 miles, the positive pass-through rate 
declines toward the zero pass-through line; however, as market distance further increases, 
the negative pass-through rate increases in magnitude by moving further away from the 
zero pass-through rate line. 
   Figure 3: Relationships between estimated Mean Product-level Pass-through Rate and Market Distance 
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4. Conclusion 
The primary objective of this paper is to examine the market mechanisms through 
which crude oil price may influence airfare, which facilitates identifying the possible 
market and airline-specific characteristics that may influence the extent to which crude oil 
price changes affect airfare. We first use a theoretical model of air travel demand and Nash 
equilibrium price-setting behavior of airlines to derive clear theoretical predictions that 
guide proper specification of a reduced-form regression model, and help with interpreting 
empirical results from the regression model. According to our theoretical model, the pass-
through from crude oil price changes to changes in airfare is facilitated by demand-side, 
supply-side, and competitiveness features of origin-destination air travel markets. A key 
demand-side feature is consumers’ willingness to substitute between driving and flying, a 
key supply-side feature is the extent to which an airline’s marginal cost is influenced by 
changes in jet fuel price, while a key competitiveness feature is the number of competing 
products in the origin-destination market. 
Our empirical estimates reveal a mean product-level crude oil-airfare pass-through 
rate/elasticity of -0.065, suggesting that a 1% decline in the crude oil price results in a mean 
0.065 percent increase in airfares. While not all products in the sample have negative 
estimated crude oil-airfare pass-through rates, the vast majority (approximately 86.7%) do. 
Consistent with predictions from our theoretical model, we find evidence that the 
sign and size of the pass-through of crude oil price changes to airfare depends on several 
market and airline-specific factors, with airline fuel hedging and relatively long distance 
travel markets being the strongest determinants of a crude oil-airfare pass-through rate 
being negative. First, we find that airlines’ adoption of jet fuel hedging contracts has a 
significant impact on airline pricing as well as the pass-through elasticity of airfare with 
respect to crude oil price changes. On average, the value of crude oil-airfare pass-through 
elasticity declines by 0.005 for each percentage increase in the proportion of airlines’ jet 
fuel consumption covered by hedging contracts. Furthermore, counterfactually shutting 
down the influence of airline fuel hedging yields a positive crude oil-airfare pass-through 
rate among nearly half (49.3%) of the products in our sample, with the mean counterfactual 
pass-through elasticity being 0.0045 instead of the mean factual pass-through elasticity of 
-0.065. 
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Second, we find that the crude oil-airfare pass-through elasticity is negatively 
correlated with origin-destination market distance, and the level of this effect also varies 
by airlines’ fuel hedging ratios. In fact, if in addition to counterfactually shutting down the 
influence of airline fuel hedging, we counterfactually shut down the influence of market 
distance on the crude oil-airfare pass-through elasticity, then the mean predicted pass-
through elasticity is 0.66, with 100% of the products in our sample having a positive crude 
oil-airfare pass-through elasticity.  
Third, we find that the intensity of air travel market competition measured by the 
number of non-stop or two-or-more stop products has an average positive effect on the 
value of crude oil-airfare pass-through rate, and the level of this effect varies by airlines’ 
fuel hedging ratios. However, market competition measured by the number of one-stop 
products has a negligible negative effect on the pass-through rate. Market competition 
measured by the number of non-stop air travel products has a particularly stronger 
influence on the size of crude oil-airfare pass-through rate compared to other competition 
measures. The value of pass-through rate also increases when there are more airlines 
credibly threatening to enter the relevant market.  
A key contribution of this paper is that it provides concrete empirical estimates of 
the size of pass-through from changes in crude oil price to U.S. domestic air travel market 
fares, which has not been well studied in the literature. Furthermore, our empirical analysis 
is built on a theoretical framework that considers both demand and supply side market 
channels through which changes in crude oil price may be passed through to airfare and 
onto consumers. In the theory model, we consider both airline-specific and market-specific 
characteristics in determining the sign as well as the size of the pass-through. To the best 
of our knowledge, such an analysis has not been done in the cost-price pass-through 
literature. Relying on a reduced-form regression analysis, however, we are unable to 
empirically disentangle various demand side and supply side effects on the size of pass-
through. As such, future research may want to consider using a structural econometric 
model designed to empirically unpack the reduced-form evidence provided in this paper. 
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